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COUTHINO, CARO AND COMPANY, INC. AND FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE CO. v. M/V SAVA ET. AL. 
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 28 June 1988 
849F.2d 166 
A provision in the bill of lading referring to COGS A does not provide constructive notice of the $500 per package limitation 
of liability to a shipper. 
FACTS: In December of 1983, Couthino, Caro and Company, 
Inc. iCouthinol, a steel importer, purchased 420 coils of steel 
from a manufacturer in Spain for shipment to New Orleans, 
Louisiana. The steel was loaded aboard the M/V Sava in Spain 
and stowed in holds four and six. Two marine surveyors observed 
and recorded the loading. 
During the voyage, inclement weather conditions neces­
sitated ventilation of the cargo by opening the holds as the M/V 
Sava lacked a forced ventilation system to control the dewpoint 
in the holds. 
When the cargo was discharged in New Orleans in February, 
the coils evidenced varying degrees of rusting. A clearly defined 
waterline on the coils from hold four and standing water in hold 
six, indicated the presence of seawater in both holds. After two 
of Couthino's buyers received their portion of the shipment and 
complained of heavy rust damage, Couthino collected the coils 
at a warehouse in Chicago. Examination of the coils suggested 
flooding of the holds during the voyage and carriage of the cargo 
in a moisture saturated environment. Subsequently, the damaged 
coils were either sold at salvage or subject to depreciation 
allowances. 
Couthino and its insurer, Fireman's Fund, brought suit 
against M/V Sava for the damaged cargo in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The district 
court ruled in favor of the shipper, Couthino, but limited the 
vessel's liability to $500 per coil. Couthino appealed the order 
regarding the limitation of liability. The owner of the M/V Sava 
cross-appeals, challenging the lower court's finding concerning 
the condition of the cargo. 
ISSUE: Did M/V Sava afford the cargo shipper a fair opportun­
ity to avoid the $500/package limitation of liability by merely 
adducing a provision in the bill of lading that referred to COGSA? 
ANALYSIS: The Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit de­
termined that the clause in the bill of lading did not provide 
constructive notice to Couthino of the content ofCOGSA's limi­
tation of liability provision. 
The court noted that the case hinged on the carrier's and 
shipper's respective burden of prooof under Title 46 USC § 1304 
15l ICOGSAl. This section limits the liability of a carrier to $500 
per package for loss or damages in connection with the transpor­
tation of goods unless the shipper specifies a desire to increase 
the cargo's valuation in excess of that amount. 
In order to benefit from this limitation provision, the courts 
have held that the carrier bears the initial burden of showing 
that it offered the shipper a fair opportunity to avoid the limitation, 
General Electric Co. u. M/V Nedlloyd, 817 F.2d 1022 i 2d Cir. 
1987),cert denied, -- U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 710,98 L.Ed.2d 661 
( 1988). Yet, the circuits differ as to what evidence establishes a 
carrier's prima facie case of fair opportunity, Wuerttembergische 
u. M/V Stuttgart Express, 711 F.2d 621 15th Cir. 1983). The 
district court r:ited prior court rulings which stated that mere 
incorporation ofCOGSA by reference is insufficient evidence of 
fair notice. However, the district court relied upon the erroneous 
premise that the Fifth Circuit had rejected the rationale of these 
cases. In so doing, the district court concluded that the bill of 
lading, which only mentioned COGSA, provided the shipper with 
adequate notice of § 1304 15l, thereby constituting sufficient 
evidence of fair opportunity actually existed. The Court of Appe­
als for the Fifth Circuit pointed out that, in those cases cited, 
inclusion ofCOGSA was not the determinative factor. Instead, 
this court relied on evidence that the carrier clearly afforded the 
shipper the option to declare a valuation of its cargo after review­
ing the various shipping rates. 
In the case at bar, the bill of lading contained no such alterna­
tive. Therefore, since the carrier did not make its threshold 
showing, the shipper has no burden of proof and the M/V Sava is 
not entitled to limited liability. 
The owner of the M/V Sava contended that the coils were not 
delivered to the ship in good condition. Couthino conversely 
argued that it sought damages due to the extensive rusting of 
the steel while aboard the M/V Sava and not for minor man­
ufacturing defects. In Camemint Food Inc. u. Brasileiro, 647 
F.2d 347,355 i2d Cir. 1981) the court stated that "Plaintiff must 
show that the goods were delivered to the carrier free of the 
damages for which recovery is sought." 
In this instance, expert testimony indicated that the steel was 
free of corrosive rust when delivered to the M/V Sava. The 
district court correctly reasoned that the coils were in good 
condition when the carrier received them and rejected the owner 
of the M/V Sava's claim. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the district 
court as to finding the M/V Sava liable, reversed the judgment 
as to the limitation of liability and remanded the case for a 
determination of damages. This decision thus brings the Second 
and Fifth Circuit into agreement on this issue. 
Susan Lysaght '91 
FLOYD v. LYKES BROS. STEAMSHIP CO., INC. 
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, 9 March 1988 
844 F.2d 1044 
Absent embalming and mortuary facilities, the burial at sea of a deceased seaman rests in the discretion of the ship's captain. 
FACTS: James H. Floyd IFloydl was a seaman aboard the S.S. 
Shirley Lykes, owned and operated by Lykes Steamship Company 
of New Orleans, Louisiana !hereinafter "Lykes"l. On August 
19, 1983, while the vessel was passing through the Straits of 
Gibraltar enroute to Canada and the United States, Floyd met 
his demise by heart attack. At sea and eight days from port, the 
captain ordered and the crew made ready a burial at sea. On the 
following morning, August 20th, a message was sent to Lykes in 
New Orleans informing management of the death and pending 
burial of the deceased. That afternoon the crew positioned the 
flag draped remains at the ships stern and, after a brief service 
and eulogy by the captain, Floyd slid to his watery grave. The 
captain informed Lykes that the burial had been completed. 
Prior to the burial, neither the ship nor Lykes had notified 
Floyd's next-of-kin of the death. 
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Suit was initiated by Maria Floyd IMarial, daughter of the 
deceased, in the District Court for the Eastern District of Penn­
sylvania, alleging wrongful death and improper disposition of 
the remains, against Lykes. The district court granted de­
fendant's summary judgment motion and dismissed the wrongful 
death count for lack of evidence. As to Count two, improper 
disposition of the body, the district court dismissed the claim as 
to Maria's brothers, sisters and mother, also plaintiffs, on the 
grounds that only the next-of-kin may properly bring such action. 
Thereafter, the district court granted Lykes summary motion 
and dismissed the complaint. Maria appeals the dismissal of 
Count two as to herself only. 
(Continued ... ) 
